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Background: Emerging respiratory infections represent a significant public health 
threat. Because of their novelty, there are limited measures available to control their 
early spread. Learning from past outbreaks is important for future preparation. The 
Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome CoronaVirus (MERS- CoV ) 2015 outbreak in 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) provides one such opportunity.
Objectives: We demonstrated through quantitative methodologies how to estimate 
MERS- CoV’s transmissibility and identified the effective countermeasures that 
stopped its spread.
Methods: Using the outbreak data, statistical methods were employed to estimate the 
basic reproductive number R0, the average number of secondary cases produced by a 
typical primary case during its entire infectious period in a fully susceptible population. 
A transmission dynamics model was also proposed to estimate R0 and to identify the 
most effective countermeasures. The consistency between results will provide cross- 
validation of the approaches.
Results: R0 ranged from 2.5 with 95% confidence interval (CI): [1.7, 3.1] (using the se-
quential Bayesian method) to 7.2 with 95% CI: [5.3, 9.4] (using the Nowcasting 
method). Estimates from transmission model were higher but overlapped with these. 
Personal protection and rapid confirmation of cases were identified as the most im-
portant countermeasures.
Conclusions: Our estimates were in agreement with others from the ROK outbreak, 
albeit significantly higher than estimates based on other small outbreaks and sporadic 
cases of MERS- CoV. The large- scale outbreak in the ROK was jointly due to the high 
transmissibility in the healthcare- associated setting and the Korean culture- associated 
contact behaviour. Limiting such behaviour by rapidly identifying and isolating cases 
and avoiding high- risk contacts effectively stopped further transmission.
K E Y W O R D S
mathematical modelling, Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome CoronaVirus, parameter 
estimation, South Korean outbreak, statistical analysis, transmissibility
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1  | INTRODUCTION
Quickly measuring transmissibility of an emerging respiratory infectious 
disease is vital to preparedness of authorities and design of the optimal 
intervention strategies. The key quantity that characterises the trans-
missibility is the basic reproductive number (R0), the average number 
of new infections caused by a single infective individual introduced 
into a completely susceptible population.1 It is a threshold parameter: if 
R0<1, the disease dies out without any intervention; otherwise, the dis-
ease can persist. To monitor how transmissibility evolves and whether 
the countermeasures can reduce the transmission along the outbreak 
course, the effective reproduction number (Rt) is also a useful parameter. 
Following the 2003 SARS outbreak, especially the 2009 pandemic flu, 
effort has been made to rapidly estimate the reproductive number and 
many statistical methods2-7 were proposed for this task. Fortunately, 
these methods have now been made in publicly available software.8,9
Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome CoronaVirus (MERS- CoV), a 
zoonotic virus, was first identified in Saudi Arabia in June 2012. Multiple 
introductions to the human population have occurred from the animal 
reservoir in the Middle East, with person- to- person transmission well 
documented in healthcare and household settings. Sporadic, exported 
cases have been reported in Europe, Africa, Asia and North America 
since, with cases linked with returning travel from the Middle East. 
Although limited transmission was reported in these other regions, no 
sustained onward transmission has been detected outside of the Middle 
East until 2015. MERS- CoV transmissibility has been estimated to be 
around the threshold value of 1.0, ranging from 0.4 to 1.5.10-12 These 
estimates are mainly based on sporadic cases and self- limited clusters.13 
However, the estimation14 on a large healthcare- associated outbreak 
in Jeddah and Riyan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) during spring 
2014, with over 300 cases, suggested a higher R0 ranging from 2.0 to 6.7.
The epidemic in the Republic of Korea (ROK) during 2015 was 
seeded from a traveller returned from Bahrain after visiting the United 
Arab Emirates and the KSA, and caused an outbreak of 185 confirmed 
cases. It has been the largest outbreak outside of the Middle East so 
far,15 and much theoretical attention has been attracted to estimate its 
transmissibility. Hsieh16 used a phenomenological model to obtain an 
estimate of R0 ranging from 7.0 to 19.3. Xia et al.
17 and Kim et al.18 
used transmission dynamics models and obtained R0 = 4.4 and 5.4, re-
spectively. Reconstructing the transmission tree and considering the 
heterogeneity in the transmission processes, Nishiura et al.19 esti-
mated that the reproductive number throughout the whole outbreak 
has a mean of about 1.0 and a variance of 52.1 (it is worth mentioning 
that the mean reproductive number throughout the outbreak course is 
of no help for understanding the transmissibility of the causing patho-
gens).* These estimates differ from the studies based on previous 
MERS- CoV outbreaks10-12 and show a quite diverse picture of R0 for 
the ROK outbreak. In general, the transmissibility depends not only on 
the biological properties of a pathogen such as transmission mode and 
infectivity, but also on the susceptibility and contact patterns of the 
host populations.1 The difference in transmissibility among different 
locations and ethnic populations highlights the importance of its set-
ting dependency. It implies that given the same infectivity of a patho-
gen, the size and duration of the outbreaks it causes will depend on 
the contact patterns of the population attributable to their culture- 
associated behaviours or geographical- related environment. Different 
from Westernised culture, Koreans have the tradition to visit relatives 
and friends in hospitals and can choose the hospitals that they think 
are the best for their treatment. This culture- associated behaviour 
along with increased infectivity in hospital environment10,20 may have 
facilitated the spread of MERS- CoV in the ROK.21
Both Xia et al.17 and Kim et al.18 used dynamics models to iden-
tify the main determinants of transmission in the ROK outbreak. 
Both assume that the hospitalised patients can transmit infection to 
others, which is not true in the ROK outbreak where no infection 
was caused by confirmed cases as they were all isolated after the 
confirmation.21 Further, they both fixed the transition rates so that 
the stage durations (e.g incubation period and delay from symptom 
onset to hospitals) were implicitly assumed to be exponential. This is 
also not true as the observed stage durations are non- exponentially 
distributed (see Appendix S1). They used the least- square methods 
to estimate the model parameters, which, in view of a huge amount 
of uncertainty and heterogeneity in the outbreak,19 may not be ap-
propriate. To comprehensively understand how these variations af-
fect the estimation of transmissibility, a more general methodology 
such as Bayesian inference is needed which combined case data and 
the priors extracted from previous studies or direct estimates from 
the outbreak data.
In this study, we revisit the estimation of reproductive number of 
MERS- CoV using statistical methods on the outbreak data released 
by Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC)22 
Furthermore, by considering the actual situation of transmission 
events, we propose a transmission dynamics model to explore how 
the variation in transition rates affects the decomposition of the key 
pathways of the spread. The dynamic modelling aims to shed useful 
insights into the design of effective intervention strategies, which will 
be critical for controlling emerging respiratory outbreaks in future.
2  | DATA
The ROK outbreak started from one traveller from the Middle East 
who was confirmed with the MERS- CoV on 20 May 2015. This out-
break resulted in 186 cases including 38 deaths. Cases were scattered 
across the country. One case travelled to China, was confirmed and 
treated there; under the Chinese government’s rapid response and 
control programme, the case did not cause any onward transmission. 
Detailed outbreak data are available from KCDC.22 The information 
on each confirmed case included symptom- onset date, confirmation 
*For any outbreak of infectious disease that originated from one index case and self- limited or 
stopped under control, its overall reproductive number throughout the entire outbreak 
course has a mean equal to (n − 1)/n for an outbreak of size n. Depending on the structure of 
the transmission tree, variance in reproductive number can be as small as (n − 1)/n2 when 
each case causes one new case and the last one causes none, and as large as (n − 1)3/n2 when 
the index case cause n − 1 secondary cases. Hence the mean reproductive number through-
out the outbreak course is of no help for us to understand the transmissibility of the causing 
pathogens along the whole course of the outbreak.
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date, infection place, possible infectors, first and last exposure dates 
and date of recovery or death.
All the 186 cases had confirmation dates, but only 179 cases had 
symptom- onset dates with three healthcare workers who tested pos-
itive reportedly having no symptoms and another four cases report-
edly having symptoms but no symptom- onset dates reported. To use 
all the 186 cases, we regarded asymptomatic cases as symptomatic, 
and imputed the symptom- onset dates as following: for each of the 
seven cases, any date before its confirmation date could be its illness 
onset date with probabilities given by a gamma distribution obtained 
from the delays from symptom onset to confirmation of the 179 cases. 
Potential exposure windows for 184 cases were recorded. We gen-
erated exposure dates by assuming the actual dates were uniformly 
distributed over the exposure windows for each case. For other two 
cases that have no recorded exposure windows but have symptom- 
onset dates, any date before the symptom- onset date could be the 
exposure date with probabilities given by the fitted incubation period 
distribution.
For 162 cases, the outbreak investigators observed a unique likely 
infector. As in the KSA nosocomial outbreaks,23 superspreaders were 
detected in the ROK outbreak: with only five cases responsible for the 
majority of confirmed cases and producing more than 80% of all 185 
onward transmissions.
The Central MERS- CoV Control Office in Korea (KoMCO) in-
formed daily on all new confirmed cases and their details from the 
fourth confirmed case on 26th May onwards through its websites 
(mainly in Korean and some in English) and the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) group on the World Health Organization (WHO) 
web site (in English). They started quarantining close contacts with 
confirmed patients from 20th May including family members and hos-
pital staff. Prior to 30th May, only KCDC conducted the confirmation 
tests. From then, the tests were conducted in local provincial trusts. 
From 6th June, the government started revealing all hospitals where 
confirmed patients visited. The Task Force to control the outbreak was 
established on 8th June and extra 250 officers were put to deal with 
quarantining and the contact tracing work. On 18th June, the Prime 
Minister of the ROK announced that he would control the outbreak. 
There was no law defining MERS as a notifiable infectious disease 
until 9th June. The timeline of these intervention measures is shown 
in Figure 1.
3  | METHODS AND MODELS
3.1 | Modelling the transmissibility
To describe the ROK outbreak, we propose a transmission dynamics 
model by ignoring complexes such as age and geographical heteroge-
neity in transmission rate. MERS- CoV is zoonotic and can transmit via 
direct contact or large virus- laden droplets. It can pass from animals 
to humans and from humans to humans.12 Because of no zoonotic 
infection in the ROK outbreak, we only consider the human- to- human 
transmission. Although all transmissions occurred within hospitals, the 
affected hospitals were distributed across the ROK21,22 so we assume 
the ROK population of size N=51 413 925 in mid- 201524 are involved 
in the outbreak. On 4th May, all the people are assumed to be sus-
ceptible (S) except the index case who carried the virus but was not ill 
until 11th May. Contacts with cases will first become infected (E) and 
become infectious (I) after the latent period. In this study, we assume 
that latent period is equal to incubation. It has been noted elsewhere 
that asymptomatic MERS- CoV infections are not rare23,25; however, 
only three asymptomatic infections were detected among 16,752 
close contacts during the ROK outbreak.26 As these asymptomatic 
cases do not cause further infections, we assume that all infected 
people are symptomatic and admitted to hospitals and then being 
confirmed (C). It is worth mentioning that during the ROK outbreak, 
all transmissions occurred in hospitals. That is, the people who got 
infected (except the index case) are patients in hospitals due to other 
diseases or healthcare workers or visitors who visited friends and rela-
tives there. Once confirmed, the cases would be put under security 
and isolation in designated facilities. The ROK outbreak data show 
that no infection was caused by confirmed cases so we assume con-
firmed infections do not contribute to the transmission process.17,18 
Confirmed cases either recover or die. The ROK population is there-
fore decomposed into four compartments: S- E- I- C and transmission 
dynamics is approximated by
dS
dt
=−ω(t)β
I(t)S(t)
N
(1)
dE
dt
=ω(t)β
I(t)S(t)
N
−E∕L
dI
dt
= (E∕L)− (I∕D)
F IGURE  1 The timeline of intervention measures along with the 
exposure dates of cases. Here, exposure dates of cases are assumed 
to be uniformly distributed over the recorded potential exposure 
windows. The index case is exclusive with his exposure window from 
29 April to 2 May 2015
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The definitions and priors of parameters are listed in Table 1. We as-
sume the epidemic starts from 11th May when the index case symp-
tom onset with the initial seeding as: E(0) = 0, I(0) = 1, C(0) = 0. Two 
types of parameters are defined to reflect the people’s response and 
countermeasures to the MERS- CoV infection: the self- protection co-
efficient (ω) in these who are infectious and before confirmation, and 
the delay from symptom onset to confirmation (D) reflecting the diag-
nosis testing rate. They are assumed to vary as,
with t1 representing the breaking point. As shown in Figure 1, no 
one measure event can assume significantly as a clearly subjective 
breaking point; t1 will be sought objectively by comparing the deviance 
information criterion (DIC) among model variants with different dates. 
The basic reproductive number before intervention at day t1 is,
and after the intervention, it becomes
Here, E() stands for the mean of the distribution. To test model 
sensitivity to variation in people’s responses, we also consider the sim-
plified situation by ignoring the differences in people’s response and 
assuming a same diagnosis rate (i.e a constant delay from symptom 
onset to confirmation) over the whole outbreak.
Here, it is worth discussing the target population of transmission 
dynamics of MERS- CoV infection in the ROK. All cases in the out-
break, including healthcare workers, patients and visitors, were linked 
to healthcare settings19,27; it is thus appropriate to assume that the 
transmission only acts on the people in the healthcare facilities as did 
in Lee et al.28 However, it should be noticed that the people in the 
ROK can freely visit any hospitals they want and relatives and friends 
have the tradition to visit the patients in hospitals.21 This may indicate 
that the infection can actually spread on a wide and large population. 
Technically, as the frequency- dependent contact rate in equation (1) 
was assumed, whether using N = 51 413 925 or N = 10 000 as,28 pro-
vided N≫186, this will not affect the estimation of model parameters.
3.1.1 | Inference model
To reflect the huge dispersion in the daily number of cases, the nega-
tive binomial likelihood function was used. The number xi(t) of cases 
on day t is distributed as
where
Here, η is the dispersion parameter and μi(t) are the predictions of the 
cases on day t from the transmission dynamics. Here, index i stands for 
three different observational data: infection (E), symptomatic cases (I) 
and confirmed cases (C).
Assuming that the observed incidence xi(1), xi(2),…, xi(Ti) are condi-
tionally independent, the total likelihood given parameters Θ is
dC
dt
= I∕D
ω(t)=
{
1 t< t1
ω t≥ t1
(2)D(t)≡
{
D0 t< t1
D1 t≥ t1
(3a)R0=βE(D0)
(3b)Rc=ωβE(D1)
(4)l
i(xi(t)|Θ,η)= Γ(xi(t)+ rit)
Γ(ri
t
)Γ(xi(t)+1)
(
1
η
)ri
t
(
1−
1
η
)xi(t)
,
(5)ri
t
=μi(t)∕(η−1)
TABLE  1 Model parameters: their priors and posteriors
Parameters Definition Priors Source Posteriors
βI Transmission coefficient Γ(1.5, 2.0) with mean = 0.75 
SD = 0.61
17 0.99 (95% CI: 0.74, 1.42)
L Incubation period Γ(4.44, 0.55) with 
mean = 8.07 SD = 3.83
Estimated (Figure A1 
in Appendix S1)
8.19 (95% CI: 5.49, 11.66)
D0 Delay from symptom onset to 
confirmation before 28th May
Γ(3.28, 0.48) with 
mean = 6.83 SD = 3.77
Estimated (Figure A2 
in Appendix S1)
9.26 (95% CI: 4.25, 18.03)
D1 Delay from symptom onset to 
confirmation after 28th May
Γ(3.28, 0.48) with 
mean = 6.83 SD = 3.77
Estimated (Figure A2 
in Appendix S1)
4.05 (95% CI: 1.80, 6.93)
ω Self- protection coefficient Γ(2, 2) with mean = 0.50, 
SD = 0.22
17 0.091 (95% CI: 0.043, 0.235)
η Dispersion parameter Γ(3.125, 0.3125) with 
mean = 10.0, SD = 5.6
29 3.72 (95% CI: 2.89, 4.93)
Serial interval Γ(9.83, 0.72) with 
mean = 13.65, SD = 4.35
Estimated (Figure A3 
in Appendix S1)
aΓ(8.33, 0.66) 
mean = 12.62 days 
SD = 4.37 days
R0 Basic reproductive number – – 9.11 (95% CI: 5.32, 15.92)
Rc Reproductive number after effective 
intervention
– – 0.368 (95% CI: 0.251, 0.508)
aEstimate from transmission tree reconstructed by the method of Hens et al.7
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where the starting points of the three series are tE = 3, tI = 1, 
tC = 10, respectively, and their end points are TE = 48, TI = 53, TC = 55. 
(As the exposure date of the index case is earlier than 11th May, only 
185 cases are used for the exposure date series.)
The priors f(Θ) for parameters are extracted from the literature or 
direct estimation from the ROK outbreak data (see Table 1). Employing 
Bayesian framework through the combination of the priors f(Θ) and the 
likelihood L(Θ,η;x), the posterior distribution can be obtained by Markov 
chain Monte Carlo simulations (MCMC). From these samples, we obtain 
means and their 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for parameters.29
The DIC that was used to compare the performance of model vari-
ants is defined30 as
The most parsimonious model variant is the one that has the small-
est DIC.
3.2 | Estimating the transmissibility
Some packages coded in R- computing language are available for es-
timating the transmissibility once the incidence time series data and 
serial interval (SI), which is defined as the difference in symptom- 
onset dates of infectee- infector pairs, are known. The six approaches 
used are listed in Table 2 and briefly described below. For these 
methods, we assume the SI distribution of mean = 12.62 days and 
SD = 4.29 days, which is directly estimated from the data (Figure A3 
in Appendix S1) and close to the previous estimate by Cowling et al.31
Exponential growth rate method3 estimates R0 by formula 
R0 = 1/M(−r), where r denotes the estimate of initial exponential 
growth rate and M stands for the moment generating function of SI 
distribution; maximum-likelihood estimation method6 assumes that 
the number of secondary cases caused by an index case is Poisson- 
distributed with expected value R0; sequential Bayesian method
5 ap-
proximates the SIR model by assuming the incidence at next time 
point is Poisson- distributed with mean equalling to the product of the 
current incidence and exp{(R0 − 1)/(infectious period)}; time-depen-
dent transmission tree method2 estimates reproduction numbers using 
transmission tree based only on the gaps in symptom- onset dates be-
tween patients. These four methods are coded in the R0 package.8
Package “EpiEstim” ,9 which was based on the Nowcasting method4 
that takes censoring into account, provides a method to estimate the 
instantaneous reproductive number (Rt) smoothing by averaging over 
an interval. The transmission tree method7 is a development of an-
other method2 by further combining the possible contact information 
to construct the transmission tree. The new method applies Bayesian 
inference to simultaneously estimate the most likely transmission tree 
and SI distribution.
4  | RESULTS
4.1 | Model selection of transmission dynamics
The model comparison (Table 3) shows that the model variants with 
the breaking point in contact rate and diagnosis response to infection 
(6)L(횯,η;x)=
∏
i=E,I,C
Ti∏
τ=ti
l
i(xi(τ)|Θ,η),
(7)DIC= 1
2
Var
(
Dev(Θ,η)
)
−2 log
(
L(Θ,η;x)
)
TABLE  2 Comparison of statistical methods used for estimating R0 of MERS- CoV in the ROK outbreak
Method EG ML SB EpiEstim TD Transmission tree
Reference 3 6 5 4,9 2 7
Data required Incidence data 
during the early 
phase of an 
outbreak; GT
Incidence data 
during early phase 
of exponential 
growth; GT
Incidence data during 
the early phase of an 
outbreak; infectious 
period
Incidence 
data; GT
Incidence data 
(symptom- onset 
dates); GT
Incidence data 
(symptom- onset 
dates); contact 
information
Mixing 
required
No No Random Random Random No
Output Exponential growth 
rate and the best 
R0 selected by 
deviance- based 
r- squared statistic
The best R0 selected 
by deviance 
r- squared measure
R0 over the period of 
exponential growth
Effective 
reproductive 
number (Rt) 
averaging 
over a fixing 
window
Symptom 
onset- based 
transmission tree 
and Rt by 
averaging overall 
all transmission 
networks
Transmission tree, 
Rt and serial 
interval 
distribution
Results 6.36 [4.25, 9.68] 
Exponential 
growth rate: 0.155 
[0.119, 0.194] 
See Appendix S1
5.89 [4.42, 7.66] 
See Appendix S1
2.45 [1.68, 3.12] 
See Appendix S1
7.15 [5.26, 
9.35] 
See Figure 3
5.19 [3.34, 7.45] 
See Figure 4A
6.18 [2.80, 14.6] 
See Figure 4B
EG, exponential growth rate method; ML, maximum- likelihood method; SB, sequential Bayesian method; TD, time- dependent transmission tree method 
using tree reconstruction method.2 The four methods are coded in package “R0.”8
GT: generation time, time gap in infected times between an infectee and its infector which is usually approximated by serial interval—the gap in symptom 
onset between an infectee and its infector.
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at 28 May 2015 are the best. Figure 2 illustrates the model fitting 
with data for the best model variant. In accordance with the sugges-
tion of Spiegelhalter et al.,32 however, model variants with the break-
ing point at 29th May are not substantially different from the best 
variant, and are also good. This suggests that the effectively break-
ing point took place on 28th or 29th May. This is in agreement with 
the result of Hsieh16 who fitted the Richards model to cumulative 
case data. Transmission dynamics modelling suggests the reproduc-
tive number before the intervention (R0) has median 9.11 and 95% 
CI [5.32, 15.92] with the breaking point at 28th May (or 6.85 [4.13, 
11.92] if the breaking point is at 29th May) for the model assum-
ing both contact rate and diagnosis rate vary with the breaking point 
(Table 1 and Table C1 in Appendix S3). For the model that assumes 
only contact rate varies with the breaking point, the estimates of 
R0 are: 6.07 [4.20, 8.70] (5.36 [3.76, 7.60]) (see Tables C2 and C3 
in Appendix S3). These estimates are compatible with the previous 
studies.16-18 Although all16-18 used cumulative data while we use daily 
incidence data, the similar estimates were obtained. This implies the 
limited influence of using different data set on the results. These es-
timates show that R0 of MERS- CoV in the ROK is far beyond the 
threshold level.
4.2 | Statistical estimation of transmissibility
The three estimation methods (exponential growth rate, maximum 
likelihood and sequential Bayesian) show estimates of R0 (Table 2 and 
Appendix S2) with medians and 95% (CIs): 6.4 [4.3, 9.7], 5.9 [4.4, 7.7] 
and 2.5 [1.7, 3.1], respectively, which are consistently beyond the 
threshold level.
The effective reproductive numbers (Rt) are obtained from averag-
ing over an interval4 and from construction of transmission tree.2,7 The 
results from EpiEstim package9 slightly depends on the length of av-
eraging interval (Figure 3). For example, with averaging interval = 13, 
15 and 20 days, the Rt at day 23 (2nd June) has median and 95% CI as 
6.23 [5.04, 7.54], 6.38 [5.18, 7.70] and 6.36 [5.16, 7.68], respectively. 
TABLE  3 Comparison of model variants against the varying 
breaking points. Best DIC in bold
Model 
assumption
Both contact and diagnosis 
rates vary with the 
breaking point t1
Only contact rate varies 
with the breaking point t1
Breaking 
point (t1) DIC R0 [95% CI] DIC R0 [95% CI]
25 May 2015 671.4 6.97 [3.64, 13.67] 680.0 3.46 [2.08, 5.98]
26 May 2015 656.9 8.07 [4.32, 15.32] 660.81 5.07 [3.05, 8.25]
27 May 2015 636.2 9.86 [5.56, 17.81] 639.4 6.20 [4.10, 9.24]
28 May 2015 626.5 9.11 [5.32, 15.92] 628.2 6.07 [4.20, 8.70]
29 May 2015 631.5 6.85 [4.13, 11.92] 630.8 5.36 [3.76, 7.60]
30 May 2015 644.5 5.65 [3.46, 9.74] 643.9 4.35 [3.02, 6.19]
31 May 2015 652.7 4.34 [2.76, 7.31] 650.7 3.70 [2.57, 5.26]
2 June 2015 669.8 2.99 [1.98, 4.86] 666.4 2.60 [1.81, 3.71]
4 June 2015 677.1 2.44 [1.64, 3.82] 673.1 2.15 [1.54, 3.01]
6 June 2015 688.0 1.78 [1.32, 2.64] 683.9 1.85 [1.34, 2.56]
8 June 2015 698.6 1.39 [1.17, 1.88] 701.7 1.51 [1.17, 2.10]
F IGURE  2 Transmission dynamics 
model fitting to the confirmed, 
symptomatic and exposed cases data under 
model assuming the breaking point at 28th 
May in both contact and diagnosis rates. 
Red filled circles are the cases data, thick 
blue lines represent the median predictions 
from transmission dynamics model, and 
the thin blue lines represent 95% credible 
intervals
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As 10th June (day 31) is a day with a delay of mean serial interval 
13 days from the breaking point (28th May), in view of Nowcasting 
method4 that takes censoring into account, we regard the average of 
Rt before this date as an estimate of R0. Taking the averaging interval of 
13 days, the median and 95% CI of R0 are 7.15 [5.26, 9.35].
Estimates of Rt from transmission trees reconstructed are 
shown in Figure 4. The two methods2,7 show different patterns in 
Rt along the outbreak course: the relative smooth changes for the 
former (Figure 4A) and erratic evolution for the latter (Figure 4B). 
The huge variance in Figure 4B indicates the cluster transmissions. 
For example, three cases have symptom onset on 21st May; the 
estimate of Rt on the day has mean of 28 but a wide 95% CI ranging 
from 0 to 85. The large variation in Rt can also be seen on 20th May 
and 5th June. The difference between the two methods is because 
Hens et al.7 further include the information of infector- infectee pair 
contacts. Nonetheless, the overall average decline patterns of Rt in 
Figure 4 appear similar to those shown in Figure 3. With the fully 
reconstructed transmission tree, we can easily estimate generation- 
based reproductive number Rg. From the sample transmission tree 
listed in Figure 4, we found Rg reduced quickly, from initially Rg = 28 
to Rg = 4.43 with a large standard deviation of 16.2 on the second 
generation and on the third generation the mean of Rg became 
below the threshold level: Rg = 0.27 with a moderate standard de-
viation of 1.16. Approximating R0 by averaging Rt before 28th May 
(the breaking point), the mean and 95% CI are 5.2 [3.3, 7.5] and 
6.2 [2.8, 14.6] by the methods of Wallinga and Teunis2 and Hens 
et al.7 respectively. The two methods obtained the similar mean but 
quite different variations. The reason is that Wallinga and Teunis2 
implicitly assumed that the population is well mixing and that the 
probability of one case being an infector of another cases is only 
determined by the gap in symptom- onset dates between the two 
cases. This difference also reflects the superspread: most infections 
are caused by a few of infections, while many other infections cause 
none.
4.3 | Interventions
The transmission dynamics model considers the actual observation 
that the infected people can transmit infection to others only during 
the period from symptom onset to confirmation. Correlation analy-
sis (Table 4) shows that the rapid diagnosis through shortening delay 
from symptom onset to confirmation and self- protection are the 
main contributing factors to transmissibility. With countermeasures 
from 28th May, which reflect in both the self- protection coefficient 
(w = 9%) and shortened delay from symptom onset to confirmation 
(from D0 = 9.3 days to D1 = 4.1 days; cf.,
33), R0 is substantially reduced 
from 9.1 [5.3, 15.9] to below the threshold level: Rc = 0.37 [0.25, 0.51] 
so the transmission is completely under control and stops. The inter-
vention is characterised by the increased quarantine in designated 
hospitals and self- protection of the public to reduce the contact rate 
and the quick response to symptom onset for confirmation test with 
implementation of appropriate isolation procedures.
5  | DISCUSSION
The characterisations based on the previous small outbreaks and 
sporadic cases suggest that MERS- CoV is severe but not very conta-
gious.10-12 The ROK outbreak caused 185 new cases and lasted about 
2 months (Figures 1 and 4C). All 186 cases were put into special care 
and 38 died in the end. In this study, we applied different statisti-
cal estimation methods.7-9 The estimates from these methods are 
roughly in agreement with each other and these estimates suggest 
that R0 of MERS- CoV in the ROK outbreak is quite high with mean 
of around 2.5- 7.2. Our dynamics models indicate that the transmis-
sion process experiences an effectively breaking point at 28 or 29 
May 2015 in contact and diagnosis rates. In view of the intervention 
timeline shown in Figure 1, this effective breaking point indicates that 
both quarantining close contacts and informing the public the actual 
situation of outbreak could be the main countermeasures. Before this 
breaking point, R0 could range from 5.4 to 9.1 depending on the day 
of the breaking point. These estimates well overlap with the statisti-
cal estimates. Although being significantly higher than the estimates 
based on the previous small outbreaks, our estimates are compatible 
with others on the ROK outbreak16-18 and also the estimate on the 
2014 outbreak in the KSA.14,34 In view of these analyses, R0 of MERS- 
CoV before the effective intervention can be much higher than the 
threshold level in the healthcare- associated environment. This result 
suggests that MERS- CoV is not only severe but also highly contagious 
at least under the Korean healthcare culture.21
It is well known that the overall transmissibility of MERS- CoV 
in community is very low.35 Most introductions are not followed by 
human- to- human transmission or with only limited transmission.36 
Occasionally due to a range of factors such as long delay from symp-
tom onset to isolation, long stay in hospitals and visiting more health-
care facilities,37 more extensive outbreaks can happen such as the 
spring 2014 outbreak in the KSA.14 Naturally if you measure R0 in one 
of these larger outbreaks, it will be bigger—it might be difficult to tell 
F IGURE  3 The effective reproductive number obtained by EpiEstim 
package. The estimates are obtained over a gap of 13 days. The 
symptom- onset data are used for model fitting. Solid line represents 
the mean and dashed the upper and lower levels of 95% CIs. The 
horizontal dotted line represents the threshold value R = 1. The 
estimates show that Rt reduces to below 1.0 from 14th June (day 37)
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whether or not that is only because you have ignored the data from all 
the individual cases/clusters which suggest much lower R0. The ROK 
outbreak is the largest outside of the Middle East and has one clear 
index case. With all the suspected are closely quarantined and moni-
tored in the ROK,26 the chance for missing such individual cases/clus-
ters is extremely low. Therefore, the above results should be robust.
Our dynamics model is simplified in many aspects, such as ignor-
ing the age variation in transmissibility and superspreaders.27,28,31 
Although transmission was only taken place in hospitals, our model 
assumes the transmission occurs in the wide population and therefore 
ignores the setting- dependent transmission. Understanding how these 
factors impact the transmission process can provide further informa-
tion for the outbreak. For example, as far as the non- pharmaceutical 
interventions such as closing mass gatherings and school are con-
cerned, it is important to explore the age- structured population dy-
namics of transmission. To identify how Korean culture- associated 
behaviour affects the spread, it is necessary to investigate the spatial 
and setting- dependent transmission dynamics. Even with these lim-
itations, our dynamics model roughly catches the basic characteristics 
of the transmission dynamics during the ROK outbreak as evidenced 
by the agreement of its R0 estimate with statistical methods and rea-
sonable identification of breaking point in contact and diagnosis rates. 
Hence, it should provide useful information for us to understand the 
outbreak.
Our estimate of R0 is different from the previous,
10-12 which ap-
pears understandable. For small outbreaks or sporadic cases on which 
the previous analysis mostly based,13 the transmission processes end 
naturally without intervention. The ROK outbreak differed from the 
previous outbreaks in two ways: it was the largest outbreak outside 
of the Middle East so far and ended under the strong countermea-
sures.21 Analyses indicate that transmission appears to be amplified 
in healthcare setting.10,20,21,27,28,37 Specifically, Chowell et al.12 who 
F IGURE  4 Transmission tree reconstruction and estimation of effective reproductive number. (A) Effective reproductive number (Rt) 
estimated by the method2; (B) Rt by method.
7 (C) A sample transmission tree reconstructed by method.7 In panels (A) and (B), filled circles 
represent means and triangles the lower and upper levels of 95% CIs. Notice the huge variation in Figure 4B, especially on day 11 (21st May), 
the Rt has mean 27.8 and 95% CI ranging from 0 to 85. (The 97.5% level point 85 is not shown in the Figure 4B.) In the transmission tree that 
describes who acquired infection from whom among 185 cases, 162 cases (black circles except index case) know their unique infectors and the 
infectors of other 23 cases (red triangles) were reconstructed by method7
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modelled the progression of MERS- CoV cases in 2013 concluded 
that the relative contribution of hospital- based transmission is over 
four times higher than that of community transmission. This suggests 
another reason why the transmissibility of MERS- CoV in the ROK is 
much higher than the previous analyses because all the transmission 
events during the ROK outbreak were observed to occur in hospitals. 
This in return lends evidence that the healthcare environment is fertile 
soil for the transmission of MERS- CoV14 and hints the importance of 
strengthening hospital infection control programmes.
The occurrence of the ROK outbreak also reflects the effect of 
the Korean traditional culture that relatives and friends would like to 
visit patients in hospitals and patients have freedom to choose “bet-
ter” hospitals.21 This culture and mobility allow infected people to 
move among hospitals, and increase the contact rates between the 
infected and the susceptible; at the early stage of the outbreak, this 
helps the infection quickly spread. This further hints the reason why 
when MERS- CoV hit Westernised countries only limited transmission 
was experienced, but only causes a big outbreak in the ROK.
Our dynamics modelling shows that facilitating early diagnosis by 
shortening the delay from symptom onset to confirmation and imple-
mentation of infection control measures such as self- protection and 
quarantining are efficient measures. Both reflect changes in people’s 
behaviour upon knowing the outbreak situation. The first factor im-
plies quick response and confirmation of the infected people so that 
the period they can transmit was decreased. The second factor re-
duces contacts, implying that keeping the community informed the 
true outbreak situation is important for control. The two interventions 
(self-protection and quick diagnosis) might be accomplished by differ-
ent people: the latter can only be accomplished by those who became 
ill and their close contacts while everyone in the system can change 
their behaviours to become self- protected. In reality, it is likely that 
these two effects initiated in separate moments; however, the sep-
arate breaking points may not much impact the results as indicated 
in Table 3: the model variant that assumes only time- varying self- 
protection performs nearly as good as the best model that assumes 
time variation in both self- protection and diagnosis rate. Thus, using a 
simultaneous variation in the two interventions should provide a good 
approximation to the true situation.
Model simulations (data not shown) suggest that if the public 
awareness of the outbreak could be made 3 days earlier, the total 
infected people reduced to fewer than 100. However, the simulations 
also indicate that if the countermeasures were delayed by 3 days, the 
outbreak size would double. Therefore, the lesson we learned from the 
outbreak is to rapidly isolate any suspected infected people who are 
hospitalised and their close contacts.
Lee et al.28 also proposed a dynamic transmission model to anal-
yse the MERS- CoV outbreak in the ROK by explicitly incorporating 
superspreading events and time- dependent transmission and iso-
lation rate. As they separated the two largest spread spreaders (of 
R = 80 and 24, respectively) from the whole system, the reproduc-
tive number during pre- intervention was estimated to be below the 
threshold level of 1.0. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice the 
followings. Lee et al.28 based on survey22 to assume the date that 
intervention started was 7 June 2015, and the duration from illness 
onset to diagnosis reduced from 6 days to 2 days. The inference from 
our transmission dynamics suggested that the objective intervention 
started from 28 May 2015, and the delay from symptom onset to 
confirmation decreased from 9.3 to 4.1 days. Lee et al.28 also as-
sessed the effect of timing of control measures and like ours found 
that the early initiation of countermeasures can substantially reduce 
the size and duration of outbreak.
A historical analysis38 indicates the average trend that more than 
two new species of human virus are reported each year, which was 
further confirmed by the recent emergence of Swine flu, MERS- CoV, 
Ebola and Zika. Anticipation of novel virus species must be included in 
public health planning. Although we cannot predict their severity and 
transmissibility, learning from the past outbreaks and thus training our 
public health service system is an important part of our preparedness. 
One key lesson learned from the past outbreaks of emerging patho-
gens including SARS, Ebola and MERS- CoV is the setting- dependent 
transmissibility. For any potentially oncoming novel pathogens, it is 
hard (if possible at all) to predict their biological properties. The only 
strategy that can use as countermeasures is to reduce the contact 
rates such as closing mass gatherings and avoiding any unneces-
sary contacts. Hence, the knowledge is crucial about what changes 
in human behaviour and contact patterns help reduce the chance of 
their emergence and outbreak, or can avoid their rapid and large- scale 
diffusion among populations. Nevertheless, hospitals are clearly im-
portant settings for amplifying transmissibility,37 many of which cases 
will be hospitalised, thus increasing the risk of exposing healthcare 
Input parameters
Correlation coefficient with
R0 Rc
Transmission rate (β) −0.313 −0.266
Incubation (L) 0.308 −0.424
Self- protection (ω) from 28th May −0.171 0.650
Delay from symptom onset to confirmation (D0) before 
28th May
0.911 −0.166
Delay from symptom onset to confirmation (D1) after 
28th May
0.167 −0.243
Dispersion parameter (η) 0.0953 0.306
TABLE  4 Correlation coefficients with 
reproductive numbers under the best 
model variant. Highest correlation in bold
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workers and other patients. This highlights the importance of ensur-
ing the early implementation of adequate infection control measures 
around severe cases to minimise such onward transmission.
6  | CONCLUSION
Our transmission dynamics model identifies a breaking point at 28 
or 29 May 2015 in contact and diagnosis rates. This breaking point 
reflects the consequence of changes in people’s behaviour for self- 
protection and Korean authority’s designated facilities to isolate and 
quarantine the close contacts. Our estimates of the reproductive 
number of MERS- CoV before the breaking point are in agreement 
with others on the ROK outbreak, albeit significantly higher than es-
timates based on other small outbreaks and sporadic cases of MERS- 
CoV. The large- scale outbreak in the ROK was jointly due to the high 
transmissibility in the healthcare- associated setting and the Korean 
culture- associated contact behaviour. Limiting such behaviour by rap-
idly identifying and isolating cases and avoiding high- risk contacts ef-
fectively stopped further transmission.
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